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2008, but started falling during the second half
of 2008. Despite this fall, many African coun-
tries are yet to recover from the severe econo-
mic and social strain caused by the sudden
escalation of prices. This situation, however,
has triggered renewed attention that could
boost agriculture and help it acquire its rightful
place on Africa’s development agenda. Indeed,
numerous opportunities to exploit Africa’s unu-
sed production potential exist, but this requires
appropriate policy responses, accompanied by
adequate investments to enhance Africa’s agri-
cultural revitalization.
This paper seeks to review current food prices
on the continent and present a country level
vulnerability analysis that formed the basis for
the Bank’s operational and policy response to
food price increases.
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The recent episode of high food prices
was more severe than previous ones and
its impact is expected to persist over the
short-to-medium term. The sharp
increases in food prices from the last
quarter of 2007 to early 2008 triggered
various reactions around the world, inclu-
ding Africa, and raised grave concerns
about food security in the Bank’s Regional
Member Countries (RMCs). Since these
developments, some changes have
occurred on global cereal markets. From
June 2008 to January 2009, international
market prices for most cereals, whose
prices had risen the most (maize, barley,
wheat and rice), have fallen. This fall was
uneven and more pronounced for barley
(traded at December 2006 price in
January 2009) than for rice (still twice
more expensive in January 2009 than in
December 2006) (IMF, 2008).
Furthermore, the actual picture in African
countries remains mixed, as the fall in
cereal prices observed on global markets
does not seem to be reflected on a uni-
form fall in cereal prices in all African
countries.
These developments are of particular
concern as cereals and tuber crops (nota-
bly cassava) constitute about 55% of the
household’s food basket (African
Development Bank, 2008). Over the
years, growth in cereals consumption in
Africa outpaced production due to several
reasons, including inadequate policy envi-
ronment and poor incentives in the agri-
cultural sector, weak capacity and inade-
quate investment flows, and climate chan-
ge. As a result, the continent is a net
importer of cereals and dairy products.
The FAO estimates Africa’s cereal import
bill at about USD 21.748 billion in 2008
and about USD 9.8 billion in Sub-Saharan
Africa in 2008, translating into 30% and
35% increase over the 2007 level, respec-
tively. Generally, the high food prices hit
developing countries harder, with these
countries recording a 42% increase over
2007, compared to 19% for developed
countries (IMF, 2008; FAO, 2008c). Low-
Income Food-Deficit Countries (LIFDCs)
are particularly under stress as they are
also net importers of petroleum products
and staple food. In its November 2008
issue of Food Outlook, the FAO estimated
the total food import bill of the Low-
Income Food-Deficit Countries (LIFDCs)
rose by 32% in 2008 (to USD 117 billion)
relatively to 2007.
In the absence of appropriate measures,
rising food prices have the potential to roll
back progress toward poverty reduction
and the attainment of MDGs. Low-income
households spend a significantly large
proportion of their income on food. These
figures are as high as 57% in Tanzania
and 62.5% in Comoros, (African
Development Bank Statistics, ICP database).
1Recent food riots and demonstrations in
Africa and elsewhere in the developing
world underscored the gravity of the bur-
den of high food prices on households.
Some African countries responded
through measures designed to either
reduce prices and/or increase access to
food (African Development Bank, 2008).
However, these responses have implica-
tions on fiscal balances and balance of
payments positions. It is against this
background that criteria for determining
relative country vulnerability were develo-
ped to guide Bank responses to the crisis.
On the basis of this index, the Bank iden-
tified 27 RMCs as critically in need of food
assistance, with another 12 requiring
assistance (African Development Bank,
2008). Even though the situation has
considerably evolved from what it was in
mid-2008, the issues of food prices and
food security, in particular, remain critical
challenges for the continent.
The purpose of this paper is to provide a
review of recent food price movements,
describe the methodology that was used
to assess the relative country vulnerability
with the aim of helping Bank operations
and RMCs design appropriate responses
to the food crisis.
The paper constructs a vulnerability index
using indicators that measure a country’s
ability to pay for food imports, the degree
of urbanization and import dependency. It
is a static approach that makes it possible
to assess a country’s vulnerability over a
one-year period. This forms the basis for
assessing the severity of the likely impact
and formulating appropriate policy res-
ponses.
In the next section, a historical perspecti-
ve of food price movements is presented.
This is followed by an analysis of recent
price increases and factors driving price
movements. Section 2 takes a special
look at trends and drivers of food prices at
the global level and in Africa. The descrip-
tion of the vulnerability index is provided
in Section 3, followed by an assessment
of the relative vulnerability of African
countries. Section 4 discusses the impli-
cations of food price increases and vulne-
rability. The African Development Bank’s
response to the crisis and conclusions
have been provided in Sections 5 and 6,
respectively.
2. Trends in Global Food Prices
2.1 Historical Perspective
Contrary to the general belief that the
food prices spike of 2007 was a surprise,
real food price increases actually started
as far back as 2003. Food prices receded
from an earlier upward movement in 1995
to reach their lowest level in two decades
in July 1999. The prices, however, rose
slowly in the following years until 2004
2when a sudden spike was noticed before
leveling off in 2005. It was only after the
acceleration in food prices in 2006 and
2007 that the world recognized the negati-
ve impacts on the majority of the world’s
poor and the threat to global macroecono-
mic stability. Compounding the situation is
the coincidence of the recent in food price
increase with high energy prices, and
indeed all commodity prices (Figure. 1).
Having reached their peak during the first
half of 2008, food prices have fallen shar-
ply to a level just below an earlier peak in
1996. That is from USD 123.2 per ton in
May 1996 to USD 119.6 per ton in
December 2008.
Africa has suffered severe food crises in
the past, but most of these were related
to weather shocks or conflicts. The
recent food crisis was different given that
it was the first time in history that the
continent was threatened by a food crisis
resulting from higher food prices rather
than by a physical absence of food.
Another new dimension was that recent
high food prices disproportionately affec-
ted the politically more sensitive urban
areas – ‘urban hunger’ – compared to the
traditional countryside as in the past.
3
Figure 1: Monthly Food and Energy Price (Indices, 2005=100)
(2)For example, the 1984 drought in Ethiopia killed more than one million people.
Data source: IMF online data, 20092.2 Recent trends in Food Prices
Globally, the prices of maize, wheat and
rice rose the most in 2008 (Figure 2).
Over this period, the price of rice, a major
staple crop on the continent doubled to
reach a record high of more than USD
1,000 per ton in April 2008 (up from USD
373 per ton in early January); the average
wheat price in March 2008 stood at USD
439 per ton (over a 100% increase over
the 2007). The average price of maize
increased by about 42%, from USD 171
per ton in November 2007 to USD 288
per ton in June 2008. This escalation of
food prices was largely a reflection of the
growing energy cost, a vital input in crop
production and processing, as well as
market speculation due to lower yields,
and a reallocation of crop land to biofuel
production. A general comparison of food
prices in 2005 and 2007 further depicts
the trends, with 2007 clearly emerging as
the year of continuous price escalation.
These trends hold true not only for
cereals, but also for sugar, dairy, meat
and oils.
All prices fell during the second half of
2008. In January 2009, commodity prices
stood at USD 173 for maize, USD 615 for
rice, USD 122 for barley and USD 239 for
wheat. Since their respective peaks, this
trend represents a 51% decrease for
barley, 39% decrease for rice, 40%
decrease for maize and 44% decrease for
wheat(3).
The food price index temporarily dropped
from its peak of 180 in early June 2008 to
about 119.1 in December 2008 (Figure 1),
and has since risen to 127.4 in January
2009. The cereal price index declined by
about 13% over the same period.
To an extent, this trend also holds true for
non-cereals. For example, the price of oil
and fats dropped by more than 6% bet-
ween August 2008 and January 2009.
While beef prices had increased by 70%
between May 2008 and August 2008, they
fell by 16% between September 2008 and
January 2009. Sugar prices were relative-
ly stable over the 2004-mid 2008 period,
but fell by 17% between August 2008 and
January 2009.
Given weakening global commodity
demand as a result of the financial crisis,
it is expected that the fall in food prices
may be sustained, from the combined
effect of falling energy prices, the relaxa-
tion of trade control mechanisms and
increased availability of wheat and better
maize yields, especially in the United
4
(3)The recorded monthly price peaks are as follows: Barley : USD 248.3 in July 08; Maize: USD 287.1 in June
08; Wheat : USD 348.6 in June 08; Rice : USD 1015.2 in April 2008.States. The correlation between food and
energy prices is particularly noticeable.
For instance, the general fall in the food
price index started just about a month
earlier than the fall in crude oil prices. In
January 2009, the New York price index
for crude oil dropped to less than USD
33.20 per barrel, representing a 78% fall
since its peak (USD 147.27) in July 2008.
Similarly, since its peak in June 2008 the
prices of natural gas had fallen by about
59% in January 2009. In January 2009
there were already some signs that food
prices might stabilize, but at a level higher
than that of 2006.
In spite of these general trends, country
experiences remain mixed.
In West Africa a mixed picture has been
observed for cereal prices. Senegal, in
particular, experienced a huge jump in
rice prices, from just above CFAF 30,000
per 100 kg, to more than CFAF 45,000
per 100 kg between June and July 2008.
In September 2008, rice prices were still
81% higher than a year before. In Burkina
Faso, on the other hand, imported rice
prices fell from their peak of about CFAF
45,000 in June 2008 to below CFAF
40,000 per 100 kg, but remained flat at
5
Figure 2: Food Price Trends (USD per metric ton)
Data Source: IMF online data, 2009CFAF 39,000 in July and August 2008. In
Mali, no fall was reported as prices stabili-
zed at above CFAF 35,000 per 100kg.
Over all, in January 2009, rice prices
somehow stabilized in Niger, Burkina
Faso and Mali, but are still 50%, 60% and
29% higher than a year earlier, respecti-
vely. FAO attributes this increase to the
sharp depreciation of the CFAF against
the dollar between July and November
2008 (from 0.24 USD/100CFAF to
0.19USD/100CFAF), and the relatively
low initial tariff levels. FAO however reco-
gnizes a series of measures that have
been implemented by governments in the
region, including the waiver on import
tariffs. On the other hand, in Nigeria, the
appreciation of the Naira against the dol-
lar and the reduction of tariff levels on rice
led to a price decline on some local food
markets (16% between May and
September 2008). However, the sharp
depreciation of the Naira against the dol-
lar (20% during the last quarter of 2008)
due to falling oil prices in November and
December 2008 may have a negative
impact on rice prices, contributing to ano-
ther general food price increase in the
country (FAO, 2008b ; FAO, 2009).
In Southern Africa, prices in South Africa
have been declining since July 2008. In
food-importing countries such as
Mozambique and Zimbabwe, prices are
still increasing while in other countries
such as Malawi and Zambia, they have
stabilized. In November 2008, prices for
maize were 107% and 73% higher for
both countries than in November 2007
(FAO, 2008b), respectively.
In East Africa, maize prices almost tripled
in 2008 over the previous year, and were
higher than USD 600 per ton in
September 2008. In Kenya, maize prices
were close to their peak (USD 379 - May
2008) and above USD 331 per ton in
January 2009, which represents a 49%
increase over the previous year. Tanzania
has experienced a continuous fall in
maize prices, from about USD 330 per
ton in January 2008, to about USD 240 in
July 2008 following a good harvest. In
January 2009, maize prices in Tanzania
were 5% lower compared to a year ear-
lier. In Ethiopia, a sharp decline in prices
has also been noticed since October
2008, but maize prices in January 2009
were still 13% higher than in the previous
year. In Sudan, Eritrea and Ethiopia,
wheat prices have been increasing
contrary to developments on the interna-
tional market. Like other cereals, wheat
prices vary considerably between these
countries (Ethiopia: USD 700 per ton;
Eritrea USD 1800 - end of July 2008). By
September 2008, the wheat prices in
Eritrea had more than doubled on a year-
to-year basis (114% increase). In
December 2008, maize prices in Sudan
and Ethiopia had increased by 18% and
52%, respectively, compared to a year
6earlier. Similarly in Khartoum (Sudan),
sorghum was quoted to trade at above
USD 406 per ton in October 2008, which
is twice the 2007 price (FAO, 2008b;
FAO, 2009).
In Central Africa, food prices are still
unstable in Central African Republic,
Chad and the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, due to civil unrest. In
Cameroon, the recovery of the poultry
industry after the Avian Influenza of
2006 negatively affected cereal prices.
The situation in the country is worsened
due to its high dependency on imported
rice. The government took action in
signing an agreement with staple food
traders in January 2009 to stabilize the
price of imported food products. The
agreement will run until June 2009
(FAO, 2009b)
In North Africa, good crop prospects in
Morocco and Egypt (for June 2009) are
expected to lessen pressure on food
prices in the coming month. In Egypt, this
may have a positive effect on inflation
which was mainly driven by raising food
prices. The yearly inflation rate dropped
from 30.9 % in August 2008 to 16.3 in
January 2009 (FAO, 2009b).
The large cereals price differences bet-
ween African countries are a reflection of
market fragmentation, arising mainly from
government controls, structural deficits
and poor transportation infrastructure.
With the exception of South Africa, these
trends also illustrate weaknesses in the
functioning of the African food market,
which does not reflect movements in
international markets, in particular, during
periods of price decline (FAO, 2008b).
The prices on African markets remain
extremely high, increasing the pressure
on household budgets, especially in food-
deficit countries. Even though prices have
started to decline in some countries, there
is no real evidence of a long-term general
downward trend, and it seems that prices
are now stabilizing at very high levels.
However, crop yields in several countries
seem to be more favorable for 2009. This
may ease the pressure on some national
markets, at least in the short-term (FAO,
2009).
2.3 Drivers of Short-Term Trends
The causes of high cereal prices are both
of a temporal and structural nature.
Adverse weather conditions, stock build-
ups, financial market crisis, the dollar’s
depreciation, high fuel prices, price
controls, and export bans are among the
temporal factors pushing up food prices
(IMF, 2008; World Bank, 2008; FAO,
2008; IFAD, 2008). Apart from declining
production in major world producing coun-
tries, for example, drought in Australia,
deep frost in China, flooding in parts of
South Asia, cold weather in Vietnam, pro-
7duction by several African countries was
negatively affected by bad weather in
2006. Chad and Tanzania were hit by
drought while Mozambique was affected
by floods in 2006. Ghana experienced
several weather shocks, including prolon-
ged droughts followed by floods in August
2007 and by another spell of drought in
2008. Similar conditions were also expe-
rienced in Angola’s cereal-producing
regions. As a response to low yields,
food-producing countries fill demand gaps
by depleting their own stocks.
Coupled with the crisis in the financial
markets, low stock levels triggered specu-
lative demand on commodity futures mar-
kets, contributing to spikes in food prices.
For instance, wheat and soybeans futures
prices on US markets more than doubled
in a year to March 2008. Corn futures
prices, on the other hand, have risen from
about USD 3.50 to USD 7.60 per bushel
in a year from June 2007. Moreover,
rising fuel prices affected food prices in
importing countries as they were faced
with higher transportation costs, and rising
food production costs. The poor state of
African infrastructure and limited accessi-
bility to some parts of Africa increase the
transport costs even further.
Inappropriate policy responses in the form
of export bans and price controls on
cereals, especially rice, in China,
Pakistan, India and Vietnam resulted in
lower prices for producers who respon-
ded by holding on to supplies to the world
market, fuelling price increases at the glo-
bal level. Some African countries (Nigeria,
Egypt, and Ethiopia) adopted similar poli-
cies on staple food products, but that did
not help; instead it worsened the situation.
However, in most of these countries, poli-
cy measures related to export restrictions
were relaxed during the second half of
2008 (Vietnam-July 2008, Pakistan and
India-October 2008). In December 2008,
China reduced export taxes for wheat and
wheat flour from 20% and 25% to 3% and
8%, respectively. Furthermore, China can-
celled a 5% export tax on maize and soy-
beans and a 10% tax on maize flour
(FAO, 2008b).
Even if the effects seem to be acute, the
changing structure in agricultural commo-
dity use and evolving production techno-
logies at the global level will have long-
term implications on food prices (Asian
Development Bank, 2008). Increased
consumption of meat, dairy and fish pro-
ducts has led to growing use of cereals
for feed production (Steinfeld et al.,
2006). On a calorie-for-calorie basis,
more cereals are needed to produce
meat than bread. In addition, cereal
requirements for bio-fuel production
increased by 22% over the 2007-2008
period and account for 5% of the world
cereal production (UN, 2009).
8As African agriculture is mainly small-
scale and subsistence-based the adoption
of techniques associated with economies
of scale remains difficult. In addition, the
move towards high-yielding varieties that
require intensive fertilizer use and irriga-
tion also contributes to rising production
costs, especially as expenditures on ener-
gy use increase (Steinfeld et al., 2006). All
these factors point to increasing produc-
tion costs that essentially are being pas-
sed on to the consumer in the form of
higher prices and affect the continent’s
competitiveness.
The strong yield increase for cereal pro-
duction in 2008 (6.6% higher than in
2007) has reduced speculative pressure
on food prices as the global cereal supply
and demand balance is getting stabilized.
According to the FAO, the global cereal
stock will increase to 496 million tonnes
(highest level since 2002) by the end of
the next cropping season. At the same
time, the reduced demand for crops by
the agro-industry and the livestock sec-
tors (used as feed) due to the current
economic crisis may contribute to the glo-
bal downward trends in crop prices, espe-
cially during the first half of 2009. As a
result of these trends, the prices of wheat
and maize on international markets were
33% and 17% lower in January 2009 than
a year before and 50% and 40% lower
than their recent peak values in February
2008 (for wheat) and in June 2008 (for
rice). Rice prices have, however, not follo-
wed these trends. In January 2009, global
market prices were 59% higher than a
year before. Nevertheless the situation
may worsen during the course of the year,
as a result of forecasted lower cereal pro-
duction in 2009 due to a reduced planted
area, especially in the USA and Europe,
and drought or low precipitation in China,
India and Latin America (FAO, 2009).
3. Cereal Vulnerability
of African Countries
3.1 Africa’s Cereal Situation
Africa is currently a net importer of
cereals, yet cereals constitute a large
share of the continent’s food basket.
Cereals, for example, constitute 69% of
total calorie intake in Niger, 64% in Egypt,
58% in Malawi, 54% in Sierra Leone, 57%
in Algeria, 53% in Madagascar, and 36%
in Liberia (Annex A). Despite the growing
importance of cereals in the food basket,
growth in cereal production in Africa conti-
nues to lag behind consumption especial-
ly for key cereals like rice and wheat. This
situation is, partly, due to declining cereal
yields, especially rice (a major staple),
with rice yields in most African countries
only a third of global averages. However,
demand for cereals has also been gro-
wing, not only because of population
9growth, but also due to changing tastes,
largely in favor of imported varieties, crea-
ting further pressure on foreign exchange
to foot the import bills.
Before the late 1970s, the continent was
self-sufficient in all food crops except for
wheat. This position changed as the
population grew, tastes and lifestyles
changed and production declined. The
urbanization level also increased coupled
with the substitution of local varieties with
cheap non-traditional cereals that became
prevalent on the markets. For example,
communities in semi-arid regions which
used to grow local grains varieties of
sorghum and millet switched to growing
short-season maize varieties. These
crops, however, continue to fail due to
inadaptability to droughts, high input
requirements, which are not always met
and seasonal shifts. In predominantly rice
consuming countries like Sierra Leone, a
similar effect was felt as tastes shifted
gradually towards cheap imported Asian
rice eventually dominated the market.
These shifts in consumption and reduc-
tions in strategic stocks as governments
embraced structural adjustment policies in
the 1980s, exposed Africa to the vagaries
of market and weather conditions. The
effect of all these factors has been an
increase in Africa’s vulnerability as its
dependency on cereal imports increased.
In 2008, over 23 African countries had a
cereal import dependency in excess of
50% of total requirements (Annex B).
3.2. Construction of a Vulnerability
Index
The continent’s increasing dependence
on cereal may be assessed by developing
a vulnerability index. The vulnerability
index forms a basis for developing targe-
ted policies and generating responses
that are specific to country groups. Rising
food prices have different impacts at the
country level, depending on the food mar-
ket and other structural conditions, nota-
bly, supply and demand conditions as well
as the structure of the economy in gene-
ral. In this context, a multi-variable vulne-
rability index is constructed to measure
the differential impact of the crisis.
A country’s vulnerability to high food
prices is assessed in terms of the coun-
try’s:
• Cereal balance;
• Ability to pay for food imports;
• Degree of urbanization; and
• Import dependency.
Important variables used in the construc-
tion of the vulnerability index include the
following:
i. Cereal balance is the difference bet-
ween the sum of production and
imports minus exports minus consump-
tion requirement. It translates into the
following equation :
• Cereal Balance (CB) = Availability of
cereals, in value terms less require-
ments,
10• Availability is defined as total cereal
production plus total cereal imports
(contracted or delivered) less cereal
exports.
• Requirements are given by the total
cereal food plus non food consump-
tion.
ii. Cereal import dependency is the ratio
of cereal imports to total cereal
consumption:
• Cereal Import Dependency (CID) =
Total Cereal Imports/Total Cereal
Consumption.
iii. A country’s ability to pay is measured
by its GDP per capita, current account
and fiscal position in 2007 in relation
to the size of its import requirements.
• Fiscal Balance (FB) (+ = surplus; - =
deficit)
• Current Account Balance (CAB) (+ =
surplus; - = deficit)
• Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
• GDP per Capita
iv. Degree of urbanization is defined as
the urban population divided by total
population.
• Urbanization = Urban Population/
Total Population
Net cereal importers have negative CBs,
hence countries with large cereal deficits
are considered vulnerable. A country’s
ability to pay for imports is determined by
its GDP level, CAB and FB position. At
the first stage, the CB, FB, and CAB are
all normalized by GDP to construct three
vulnerability indices (Vi);
where i is a country subscript. Vi lies bet-
ween 1 and -1. In the case of the
CB/GDP ratio, countries with positive
values need virtually no imports of cereals
(although they may have to imports
cereals not produced locally such as
wheat) and those with negative values
require cereal imports. Higher cereal defi-
cits imply a greater sacrifice on the part of
the country to meet its cereal require-
ments. With respect to CAB and FB to
GDP ratio, countries with surplus posi-
tions face no difficulty in paying for cereal
import requirements; those with higher
current account and fiscal deficits face
relatively challenging conditions.
The next input variable to be considered
is urbanization. This is because urban
populations are generally net food buyers,
implying that rising food prices dispropor-
tionately affect the position of the urban
poor. Thus, the burden faced by govern-
ments as a result of rising food prices
increases with higher levels of urbaniza-
tion. Consequently, an urban-weighted
measure of vulnerability capturing the
11interaction between cereal balances and
urbanization is constructed.
Given an initial vulnerability index Vi, this
normalization adjusts the country relative
vulnerability by a parameter delta (ʴ) defi-
ned as the ratio of urban population to
total population. Therefore, countries with
higher levels of urbanization become
more vulnerable when compared to those
with lower urbanization levels.
Similarly, an urban-dependency weighted
index (UDWVi) is constructed to take into
account differences in import dependency.
As with ʴ, countries with lower levels of
import dependency will have relative vul-
nerability indices adjusted by a smaller
ratio alpha (ʱ) as opposed to those with
higher import dependency levels. In the
current analysis, the higher a country’s
cereal import dependency, the higher is
its vulnerability to rising cereal prices.
Finally, country relative wellbeing, as
measured by the GDP per capita, is also
taken into account. This last step involves
normalization of the UDWVi by GDP per
capita.
The result from this normalization is that
vulnerability increases at lower levels of
per capita income and falls as per capita
income increases, everything else
constant. While it is noted that poverty
rates could have been a better measure
compared to GDP per capita, poverty data
are not available for all countries for the
relevant period. In addition, a longer per-
iod could have been used to take into
account long-term food vulnerability(4) .
3.3 Results of the Vulnerability
Assessment
Based on the results, countries were clas-
sified into four quartiles of relative vulne-
rability as follows: very high vulnerability,
high vulnerability, moderate and low vul-
nerability. Based on this categorization,
the five most vulnerable countries in the
12
(4)In particular, some countries experience recurrent famines and may react by increasing food imports. This is
captured by our index only if the famine occurred in recent times and is still affecting food trade.
(3)
(4)First Quartile are Liberia, Zimbabwe,
Guinea-Bissau, Eritrea and The Gambia
(Annex C and Table 1). In all these cases,
the factors that categorize them into the
high vulnerability group are related to the
constrained ability to pay for the required
imports. For each of these four countries,
the share of GDP required to fill the
cereal shortage, via imports, ranges bet-
ween 5% and 8%, reflecting an import bill
of 43 to 69 million US dollars. For The
Gambia, Liberia, and Djibouti, the situa-
tion is further exacerbated by an above
average degree of urbanization of 56%,
59% and 87%, respectively. Furthermore,
these countries have high import depen-
dency. Eight other countries belong to this
category of very highly vulnerable coun-
tries: The Congo (DRC), Djibouti, Sao
Tome and Principe, Burundi, Togo, Niger,
Mauritania and Sierra Leone.
The Second Quartile comprises countries
considered as highly vulnerable with
regards to rising cereal prices, but not at
such a level as the countries in the first
quartile (Annex C). While Ghana, for ins-
tance, only has localized food shortages,
the high cost of transportation and its rela-
tively weak fiscal position makes it highly
vulnerable. Its low urbanization level
means a larger part of its population lives
in the countryside, thus compounding the
problem as transportation costs increase.
C￴te d’Ivoire, Rwanda, Republic of
Congo, Kenya and Nigeria are ranked 9th
and lower in this quartile. These countries
have large proportions of their populations
being poor, hence lower per capita
incomes. Consequently, they have lower
abilities to pay, especially at the house-
hold level.
The countries shown in the Third Quartile
are considered as moderately vulnerable.
Benin, the Central African Republic,
Lesotho and Uganda are the top four in
this group. Except for Lesotho, with a
positive current account position, the
other three countries need to allocate
more than 3% of their GDP to import
cereals while they already have negative
current account positions. Algeria, Libya
and Tunisia are in this category because
of their relatively high degrees of urbani-
zation. Of these three, only Tunisia has a
negative current account balance.
The Fourth Quartile represents the group
of countries with a low level of vulnerabili-
ty. Chad, Gabon, Angola and Equatorial
Guinea are all oil producers and have
healthy foreign currency reserves. The
appearance of Ethiopia in this group is
somewhat unexpected. Although the
country has a very low import dependen-
cy ratio of only 1%, localized high food
shortages exist, though requirements
could be met from internal supplies given
the good harvests. Redistribution of food
is largely in the hands of donor agencies.
Despite its weak current account balance
(-10% of the GDP), the country has a low
13urbanization rate of only 17%. On the
other hand, Malawi, Madagascar and
South Africa are net exporters of some
cereals. They are therefore classified as
countries with low vulnerability.
Given their relatively weaker position, fra-
gile states received special consideration
in the analysis. This is because they have
weak production capacity and a number
of them are emerging from conflicts which
severely damaged their economies and
weakened their institutions. Fragile states
are thus less able to cushion their popula-
tions from rising food prices, as they lack
adequate safety nets. Hence fragile states
appear in the high vulnerability category.
As reported in Table 1, eight out of the
14
Source: African Development Bank (2008)
Note: Somalia is not included because of lack of data.
* Although Ethiopia receives substantial amounts of food aid, its national food balance is positive. The country
faces a problem of unbalanced geographical distribution of food production, which is not captured by the index
used to measure food vulnerability.
Table 1: Country Classification of Vulnerability
VULNERABILITY GROUP




















































13) Madagascarnine Regional Member Countries of the
Bank classified as fragile (Burundi,
Central African Republic, C￴te d’Ivoire,
Comoros, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Sierra
Leone and Togo) fall in the first and
second quartiles. Given the need to better
target scarce resources with the aim of
achieving the best outcomes, it appears
that fragile states need special treatment
in tackling high food prices. For these rea-
sons, Table 2 is amended to isolate fragile
states yielding five groups.
4. Implications of Food Price
Trends
4.1 Social Implications
The socio-economic impacts of rising food
prices vary according to the level of inco-
me. It is estimated that if food prices rise
by one-third, they will reduce living stan-
dards by about 3% in rich countries com-
pared to over 20% in poor countries.
15
Source: African Development Bank (2008)
* Somalia is not listed as a fragile state in ADF/BD/WP/2008/10 but included as a non-ranked country.



























































12) LibyaPoverty is still highest in Africa compared
to other regions. Therefore, rising food
prices have serious implications for the
poor and food-insecure people in Africa.
This is especially true for urban consu-
mers who are net food consumers. As a
consequence of rising food prices, hou-
seholds across Africa have had to reduce
their food intakes. Food price-related riots
were observed in countries such as
Burkina Faso, Cameroon and Niger
(IFAD, 2009).
In addition, as the poor allocate more
income to food, other expenditures on
education and health are reduced.
Moreover, the population’s ability to save
is reduced. These reduced expenditures
may further be manifested later in the
form of increased disease incidences and
lower education levels, therefore reinfor-
cing the poverty cycle. Further, during
hardships, girls have a higher probability
of being taken out of school, compared to
boys, which undermines the progress
towards gender equality.
In contrast, in rural areas, farmers that
are net food producers can benefit from
rising food prices (IFAD, 2009). At the
local level, two kinds of responses to high
food prices were recently observed in pro-
duction systems. On the one hand, a gro-
wing number of poor farmers in some
countries increased their food crop pro-
duction for home consumption and stora-
ge, shifting away from market-oriented
production. Under this shift, the produc-
tion systems apply lower levels of purcha-
sed inputs, resulting in lower output
levels. This situation was notably obser-
ved in Senegal, Congo, Mozambique and
Nigeria. On the other hand, an increasing
number of better-off farmers were able to
take advantage of opportunities generated
by high food prices to move from subsis-
tence production towards high value crop
production (maize, wheat, rice). This
situation emerged in countries where
opportunities are favorable, such as
Kenya and Uganda, characterized by
small holding sizes and market reliability
(von Braun, 2008).
These trends create an opportunity for
agriculture to find its way back on the
development agenda in several countries.
High food prices have generated positive
incentives for policy-makers, farmers and
investors to increase agricultural producti-
vity. On the other hand, price volatility
constitutes an obstacle for long-term plan-
ning in food- importing countries. Recent
downward food prices may severely
impact farmers who expanded production,
resulting therefore in income losses and
even financial distress (defaulting on
debt) . In addition, with the current global
credit crunch, farmers might also have to
scale down their planned investment as
lines of credit dry up (von Braun, 2008).
164.2 Implications for Regional Trade
and Foreign Investments
The current food price crisis offers an
opportunity to promote regional integra-
tion and trade liberalization. It has already
been noted that food price increases vary
across countries due to a number of rea-
sons. The different levels of food prices
between neighbouring countries have, in
some instances, presented a challenge
for governments. For example, large diffe-
rences in food prices are observed bet-
ween Nigeria and Niger, between
Zimbabwe and Botswana, Zambia and
Angola, Ethiopia and Somalia, and indeed
among many other African countries.
Government responses to these emerging
challenges have varied considerably
among countries. Food shortages forced
some governments to ban exports of
staples and other food products. This res-
ponse worsened the disparity in prices
among neighbouring countries. These
bans are ineffective and always result in
the smuggling of food products between
neighbouring countries, and it often leads
to higher consumer prices.
Despite this reality, regional food security
has always played second fiddle to natio-
nal food security. Responses at the natio-
nal level alone may not be effective as
they result in higher prices. In this context,
regional food security is not only a means
to reduce consumer prices, but also an
avenue to help promote social harmony
among communities in border locations.
For example, clashes are being reported
between bordering communities and infor-
mal sugar, rice and dried fish traders at
the Zimbabwe-Mozambique border.
Moreover, price differences across borders
encourage corruption in customs services.
4.3 Implications for Policies
As a response to the global food crisis,
African governments have moved to dam-
pen price increases and improve food sup-
ply. Actions from major world cereal expor-
ters that include export bans and import
restrictions (e.g. Senegal’s refusal to
accept food aid arguing that food aid is
negatively affecting domestic agriculture)
have not helped the situation. Such
actions have led to speculation and major
disruptions of international markets.
Though some of these countries eventual-
ly lifted export bans, the damage had
already been done, as it caused panic on
the markets resulting in speculation.
African countries have generally followed
three major policy responses: i) demand-
side, ii) supply-side and iii) trade-oriented
policies. Given the large share of food in
household expenditures, food price
increases also have a higher impact on
inflation, to which policy-makers have
responded through higher monetary policy,
mainly interest rate adjustments. These
measures, most of which reduce or
contract revenue flows of the institution’s
RMCs have serious fiscal implications, and
may lead to macro-economic problems. A
1718
Box 1: Malawi’s Approach to Food Shortages
Malawi has a land area of 9.43m hectares of which only 32% is suitable for rain-fed agri-
culture, but most of the soil needs fertilizers for agricultural production. Given its per capita
income of only USD 170 per year, most smallholder farmers are unable to purchase agri-
cultural inputs. The agricultural sector accounts for approximately 40% of national income
and employs more than 80% of the total labor force. The share of recurrent government
expenditure in agriculture fell from 6-7% in early 1990s to 3-5% during the late 1990s. The
Malawian government is committed to poverty reduction through the empowerment of the
poor and this is being implemented within the context of Vision 2020.
Malawi is still listed among net importers of petroleum and major grains, with high levels
of chronic hunger, by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. Acute maize
shortages in 2005 (45% deficit), were described, in August of that year, by the United
Nations as a humanitarian crisis. The shortages were considered to be a result of poor
weather, strategic grain reserve sales, long-term deterioration in rural incomes, price
fixing and smuggling. Following this, the government introduced a subsidized input-sup-
ply program at a cost of USD 60 million that benefited one million smallholder farmers.
Each farmer got seeds and fertilizer, enabling then to plant one acre of maize, the prima-
ry target, and similar inputs to cash crops like tobacco. The program was described by
some as “misguided” as the markets were better placed to deal with the situation. To
others, the program was saddled with implementation problems (poor planning, distribu-
tion system and fraud and corruption).
Despite the early criticisms, Malawi has managed to produce maize surpluses for two
consecutive years (0.5 million in 2005/06 and 1.3 million metric tones in 2006/07). Donor
support towards the program is increasing and its implementation is being refined to
make it more targeted and effective.
To fight against the soaring food crisis the government took a series of policy measures.
First in April 2008, maize exports were banned (except for the residual contract amounts
for Zimbabwe). Second in August 2008, maize private trading was banned and put under
the control of Agriculture Development and Marketing Corporation. Through this agency,
the government fixed buying and selling prices. Third, to stimulate production, the
government agreed in November 2008 to continue the subsidization of agricultural inputs
for the coming agricultural season.
Source: Adapted from FAO; UNDP 2008summary of these measures is presented
in Annex D. Malawi’s approach to food
shortages is highlighted in Box 1. For ins-
tance, reducing taxes and increasing sub-
sidies has a negative impact on fiscal
balances, which may imply future costs to
the countries, to be financed either
through increases in taxes or external and
internal borrowing. High inflation may
undermine the gains made in many of
these countries in reducing poverty over
the past decade. In particular, countries
run the risk of policy reversal, thereby
eroding the reform gains acquired so far.
Attempts to face the food crisis through
subsidies have been fiscally costly. Food
subsidies in Egypt, which are criticized for
not being properly targeted, cost the
government USD 2.3 billion for fiscal year
2007/08 (American Chamber of
Commerce in Egypt, 2008). Malawi’s
input supply scheme costs the govern-
ment an estimated USD 186 million, tri-
pling the previous year's figure of USD62
million for 2005/06. The program was
commended for revitalizing agriculture
and improving the food security situation
in the country (AfricaFocus Bulletin,
2009).
While it is important that countries seek to
minimize the short-run impact of high food
prices, it is critical to ensure that the
impact of such intervention on the fiscal
balance is limited and only short-lived.
Measures should be put in place to ensu-
re that government revenues increase
while allowing some exchange rate
adjustments to foster expenditure swit-
ching. Any measures that cause distor-
tions should be discouraged. Instead
efforts should be deployed to stimulate a
positive agricultural sector supply respon-
se to rising food prices. In addition, well
targeted safety-nets are required to
cushion the vulnerable groups. Cash
transfers, food-for-work programs and tar-
geted food packs/subsidies are some
such measures that can alleviate the bur-
den of rising food prices.
The high pressure on natural resources,
combined with the loss of confidence on
markets created by high food prices, have
also renewed attention on foreign direct
investment in agriculture. To secure their
food supply, capital-rich countries facing
natural resource constraints are investing
in African countries to secure reliable
sources of food. For instance, Egypt
invested in the agricultural sectors in
Libya, Madagascar and Sudan in 2008
while China invested in numerous African
countries. These investment flows will
directly contribute to improve agriculture
and the agro-industry in the targeted
countries and indirectly contribute to
value-addition activities. However, reci-
pient countries need to ensure that appro-
priate clauses are included in the
contracts governing these investments,
paying particular attention to the respect
19of customary property rights and trade
policy rules, supporting the participation of
local producers and ensuring that food
security is preserved in the recipient
country (von Braun, 2008).
5. The African Development
Bank’s Response
While acknowledging the short-term
impact of rising food prices in Africa, the
African Development Bank is of the view
that there are opportunities associated
with current trends. By increasing the
value of agricultural assets, high food
prices have the potential of stimulating
investment into the sector. An enabling
policy environment, however, is required.
The Bank, has capitalized on its internal
capacity and past experience in the sector
to address critical constraints and accele-
rate support to agriculture. Within the
context of the African Food Crisis
Response (AFCR) framework, the African
Development Bank adopted short-term
and medium-to-long term responses. In
this regard, the vulnerability index descri-
bed above was instrumental to the prioriti-
zation of the Bank’s response to the cri-
sis. These responses sought to enhance
the Bank’s contribution in areas where it
has some comparative advantage. Some
of these responses are summarized
below.
5.1 Short-Term Responses
In the short term, the African Develop-
ment Bank pursued specific and targeted
responses aimed at cushioning the effects
on the poor, minimizing macro-economic
instability and enhancing supply res-
ponses in its RMCs. The Bank’s role in
providing sound policy advice was also
emphasized. In its quest to stabilize food
prices, the African Development Bank
granted budget and balance of payments
support to eligible RMCs, as expressed in
the Bank’s response to the Food Crisis
paper. The Bank utilized resources from
its surplus account to support targeted
projects and accelerate disbursements
and realignment of existing agriculture
and non-agricultural portfolios to address
food crisis issues. Accelerated disburse-
ment of resources to approved projects
and realignment of existing agriculture
portfolios, however, did not imply additio-
nal resource requirements. Such realign-
ments mainly targeted improving input
supply, and increasing access to and utili-
zation of improved seeds such as the
NERICA rice seeds. Through policy advi-
ce, the Bank engaged its RMCs in dia-
logue with a view to exploring viable poli-
cy options for macro-economic stability,
while protecting vulnerable groups. In
these efforts, the Bank is cognizant of the
need for a differentiated approach in its
response depending on the vulnerability
of its RMCs and the need to ensure the
continent’s future food security.
20As reported by the Bank’s Agriculture and
Agro-Industry Department, the Bank ini-
tially identified 75 projects, including 42
agricultural projects, in 23 countries(5) as
candidates for budget realignment to
address the crisis. By January 2009, 26
agricultural and 22 non-agricultural pro-
jects had been realigned. This resulted in
a budget re-allocation of UA 86.43 million
to address productivity issues.
Furthermore, 12 operations had been
identified for budget support operations to
alleviate some of the pressure on coun-
tries’ macro-economic frameworks and
help free up resources for immediate res-
ponses to the food crisis. In addition, the
Bank allocated UA 20 million from its
Surplus Account to assist 11 countries(6)
affected by increased food prices. Finally,
the Bank has made a commitment to
enable an expansion of the total area
under NERICA cultivation over the next
two years, based on its on-going multina-
tional NERICA dissemination project in 7
West African countries(7).
The Bank has also promptly responded
by offering indirect support through other
instruments. In particular, countries affec-
ted will benefit from budget support ear-
marked for the purchase of inputs to
increase production levels since access to
inputs is widely recognized as one of the
key constraints on productivity in Africa.
The use of inputs is affected by other
constraints, including low irrigation capaci-
ty, mechanization, inadequate infrastruc-
ture, and missing or imperfect markets.
Most of these issues will be addressed
during the implementation of Medium-to-
Long Term Responses.
5.2 Medium-to-Long Term Responses
The African Development Bank’s medium-
to-long term responses were formulated
within the context of the Bank’s Medium
Term Strategy. This strategy recognizes
the importance of incentives to transform
and revitalize the agricultural sector.
Support to the smallholder sector, as in
Malawi, and women’s empowerment, may
play a big role in poverty reduction efforts.
Moreover, access and use of new innova-
tions in agriculture require increased flows
of investment into the sector to enhance
the continent’s capacity to respond to
trade opportunities and enhance its ability
to adapt to climate change. Furthermore,
the Bank’s strategy also acknowledges
the importance of a cross-sectoral
approach that addresses some of the
21
(5) Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Kenya,
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, RDC, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone
and Zambia.
(6) Burundi, Central African Republic, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Gambia, Libera, Mauritania, Niger, Sao Tome
and Togo.
(7) Benin, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Nigeria and Sierra Leoneconstraints to supply response. Finally,
the Bank is aware of the critical role of
building partnerships and harmonization
of actions to improve the effectiveness of
interventions.
In the medium term, the Bank will streng-
then internal capacity to respond more
successfully to crises in Africa. A Crisis
Response Facility (CRF) is being discus-
sed so that the Bank can provide timely
responses to emergency situations like
global price shocks and regional trade
disruptions due to conflict. Such a facility
would allow the Bank to provide quick dis-
bursing compensatory financial assistance
to affected RMCs on concessionary terms
using existing Bank instruments.
Moreover, following the endorsement of
the African Fertilizer Financing Mechanism
(AFFM) by the Bank’s Board of Governors
in March 2008, the institution moved to uti-
lize the resources available to catalyze pri-
vate sector investment in the manufactu-
ring, procurement and distribution of fertili-
zer in its RMCs. Access to fertilizers by
smallholder farmers, especially women,
will be supported. The Bank is actively
involved in the coordination of processes
under this facility.
In the long-term, measures that ensure
food security and increased participation
by the poor in income-generating activi-
ties are key. In this context, it is important
to intensify the development of new seed
varieties of staple foods and their dissemi-
nation, improve quality control and access
to financing, especially by smallholder far-
mers. Furthermore, the Bank will scale up
efforts in rural infrastructure development
and management of water resources.
This will include measures to increase
storage facilities, improve modalities of
access and efficiency in water usage. In
addition, post-harvest losses will need to
be reduced through the support to impro-
ve and increase the capacity of storage
facilities as well as human capacity buil-
ding in post-harvest management. Central
in these processes is the importance of
enhancing knowledge and management
abilities of farmers and institutions invol-
ved in agriculture. Agricultural research,
science and technology will, therefore, be
critical in promoting a commercial approa-
ch to agriculture on the continent. Also
important is the creation of an enabling
environment that encourages the private
sector to play an increasing role in agri-
culture, thereby stimulating resource flows
into agriculture.
6. CONCLUSION
Recent food price hikes have caused
hardship for the poor on the continent and
elsewhere. Millions of Africans have been
affected and there is the risk of many
people being dragged into poverty and
offsetting the modest gains that have
been made towards achieving the MDGs.
22Similarly, rising food and fuel prices are
threatening a return to the high levels of
inflation that the continent had painfully
managed to control in recent years.
Many factors are responsible for this price
hkes and appropriate policy responses
are urgently needed to ensure that the
continent is adequately equipped to cope
with the negative effects of high food
prices, while taking advantage of any
opportunities that high food prices may
present. Most African countries remain
agriculture-based and may be able to
benefit from high food prices, given the
substantial unexploited agricultural poten-
tial. Real food prices are expected to
remain high in the short-to-medium term,
and thus could stimulate increased flows
of investment in agriculture. Carefully tar-
geted programs aimed at increasing the
productivity of the smallholder sector
could help millions of Africans to overco-
me extreme poverty, through increased
production, value addition and market
orientation.,In collaboration with other
development partners, the Bank is com-
mitted to playing a leading role in helping
African countries design and implement
strategies for hedging against food price
shocks and reaping the benefits of higher
producer prices. In this respect, the
Vulnerability Index described in this paper,
will help development partners to better
target those who need assistance the
most to deal with food supply shocks.
2324
Annex A: Food Consumption Shares (% of total expenditure)25
Annex B: Cereal Balance (Values in million) (2007/08)
Source: AfDB Statistics Department, FAO (2008).
Note: Countries differ with respect to the marketing year, 2007/08 or 2008, depending on data availability, 2008 production data used for Wheat:
Botswana, Cameroun, Mauritania, Mozambique, Somalia, Swaziland; Rice: Ethiopia, Gabon, Swaziland, Maize: Djibouti, Mauritius. Products
included in the food category are wheat, rice, and coarse grain. It is assumed that coarse grains are mainly composed of maize. Thus, the world
price for maize is used to compute the value of coarse grains. Cereal Balance is defined as domestic production plus food imports/contracted or
recieved) minus domestic food and non-food consumption, and exports. Accordingly, a negative value represents a deficit, white a positive value
represents a surplus.
1A value exceeding 100 is due to stock build up, exports and/or re-exports from further processing sectors.
22007, Excluding debt relief.























































































































































































































































































Annex C: Indicators of Vulnerability and Country Ranking





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Annex D: Policy Measures Taken by Governments28
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